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The Brazilian Developmentalist State in Historical Perspective:  




The paper assesses the debates between influential writers and decision-makers involved in the 
fast-paced industrialization Brazil embarked upon in the 1950s. Although the period was shaped 
by high rates of economic growth championed by charismatic nationalist leaders, disagreements 
pertaining to the role and configuration of the developmental state gave rise to a hybrid agenda 
of development which combined both liberalizing and interventionist strategies. Through 
precarious political compromises, persuasion, and a high degree of demiurgic ambition, the 
federal Brazilian state advanced a bold project of material and symbolic modernization of 
important sectors of the national society. In the end, however, a combination of internal disputes 
and a long legacy of socio-spatial inequalities prevented the achievement of a sustainable course 
of national development, thus bequeathing the country several unanswered issues which gain 
further relevance today as Brazil assumes a relevant position within the realms of an ever more 
complex and interdependent global economy. 
 
Keywords: national developmentalism, Vargas, Kubitschek, industrialization, economic growth, 
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Introduction 
The recent period of sustained economic growth experienced in Brazil in the last 10 years 
has motivated a renewed discussion about the long-term direction of national development and 
the different mechanisms of state intervention in the country’s economy and society. Though 
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Brazil is increasingly perceived as an emergent nation of more than 140 million consumers, 
challenges towards achieving a politically sustainable and socially equitable insertion into the 
globalized economy remain. Critically reflecting on the prospects of the recent process of rapid 
economic growth in Brazil, this article revisits the paradigmatic phase of fast-paced 
industrialization and socio-economic reforms which defined the Brazilian society in the 1950s. It 
was then that, after the turbulence and uncertainty in the inter-war years, the country reached 
moments of relative and circumstantial political stability (periodically interrupted by dramatic 
events) by resorting to a strong central government whose policies reflected the productive 
intellectual exchange between contrasting schools of economic thought. 
At the dawn of that decade, Brazil had a population of around 52 million and an economy 
largely based on the production and export of agricultural commodities. The period nonetheless 
witnessed a profound transformation once important sectors of the Brazilian society began 
advocating a substantial redefinition in the nation’s traditional agrarian basis. These social 
segments put forward different views on what national development should mean, fostering a 
fruitful debate on which strategies the country should undertake in order to secure long-term 
economic growth. This historical trend notwithstanding, in the end, a national strategy centered 
on high rates of economic growth prevailed at the exclusion of more socially inclusive policies. 
Inspired by the historical parallels between mid-century and today’s challenges, this paper seeks 
to demonstrate that alternative paths were indeed available during the most promising years of 
democratic development which defined the Vargas-Kubitschek agenda of modernization.1 
The article is structured into three analytical sections. The first one contextualizes the 
post-war period, particularly the years situated within the so-called ‘developmental decade’ of 
the 1950s as a way to frame the ensuing more conceptually driven analyses. This portion is 
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followed by an examination of the different, at times diverging, developmental notions and 
projects advanced by some of the more articulated and influential intellectual and decision-
making groups of the period. As a whole, the second section indicates that, though relevant to 
most politically organized social segments, promoting fast-paced, state-led national development 
was by no means a consensual project; nor was such a goal pursued in ways that benefitted the 
majority of the country’s population. Closing the piece, the third section of the article critically 
revisits the experiences of the 1950s in light of Brazil’s present-day dilemmas and opportunities. 
 
The 1950s and the Rise of the Developmentalist State in Brazil 
In the aftermath of the Second World War the Brazilian economy was still primarily 
defined by its traditional commodity-exporting activities, although growing sectors of the 
national elite were also engaged in pursuing economic alternatives that could enhance the 
circulation and accumulation of capital. Conducive to a new historical course, the experience of 
the war had facilitated the dissemination of the goal of industrialization particularly among 
military leaders who defended the creation of national war-related industries (e.g. chemical and 
aeronautical), which were increasingly seen as vital components of an assertive policy of 
national security. Along these historical lines, the 1950s emerged as a phase of intense 
ideological and political debates among military and civilians on the prospects of national 
economic development. To be sure, an up-beat nationalistic outlook certainly defined much of 
the period and this trend was reflected in many events shaping the self-image of the nation at the 
time. In 1958, for instance, Brazil won the soccer World Cup held in Sweden for the first time (a 
significant achievement in a country where soccer had already become a national obsession) and 
the new musical style of Bossa Nova was introduced to world audiences. At the close of the 
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decade, in 1960, Brasília, the country’s new, futuristic-looking capital, was inaugurated in the 
heartland of the country as the utmost expression of modernist architecture and urban planning. 
In the same decade, domestically produced automobiles flooded the streets and the growing 
numbers of highways which crisscrossed Brazil’s immense territory. 
In a general sense, the 1950s was largely shaped by the dissemination of a nationalist 
developmental drive which guided the actions of the country’s two main political leaders of the 
period. The decade began with the return to power of former president Getúlio Vargas in January 
1951, after having conducted what had been until then the most vibrant and geographically 
extensive presidential campaign in the history of the country. Vargas’s new presidential mandate 
derived directly from his promise of deepening the path of industrialization Brazil had embarked 
since his first tenure in power which started with the 1930 nationalist military coup which paved 
the way for the modernization of the Brazilian state and economy. As the main political figure of 
that process, Vargas stewarded the creation of a corporatist-like state which, starting in the late 
1930s brought together organized business and labor sectors under the auspices of a federal 
administration acting on a self-attributed role of deepening the path of import-substitutive 
industrialization. Novel ideas around national development and industrialization were important 
outcomes of the new configuration of political forces that emerged in the process. Here was also 
a significant change in the role of the state which started to shift its focus from export-led 
agriculture and concentrated efforts on economic planning and diversification, including heavy 
industries and steel production. 
Back in power in the early 1950s, this time by the popular vote, Vargas was poised to 
implement an ambitious agenda of economic growth with some levels of social reform. Vargas’ 
political platform was inspired in the idea that the goal of industrialization had to be strengthened 
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amidst the challenges created by the reconfigured international division of labor in the post-war 
period. In contrast to the self-contained industrial policies during world hostilities, new 
circumstances required a creative economic paradigm capable of moving beyond the military 
concerns of earlier industrial initiatives, such as the creation of the National Steel Corporation 
(Companhia Siderurgica Nacional - CSN) in 1941. This broadened developmental perspective 
saw industrialization as a sine qua non condition for securing economic self-sufficiency and 
argued that more direct involvement by the national government in a variety of economic 
activities was essential.2 
Within this general political context, throughout the 1950s the Brazilian government 
increasingly adopted a more aggressive role towards industrial promotion and fast economic 
growth. This overarching goal was so important that a clear line of continuity between the 
Vargas (1951-54) and the Kubitschek (1956-1961) administrations can be easily perceived. This 
was true even in the case of the main foreign policy objectives and approaches pursued in the 
period, particularly in regards to the ever influential relations with the ‘Colossus of the North’ 
(i.e. the United States).3 Of special relevance, the Operation Pan-America (OPA), Kubitschek’s 
personal and most important diplomatic initiative, exerted significant influence in placing the 
topic of development promotion at the center of the traditionally non-economically driven inter-
American relations. OPA also represented a subtle way to reintroduce socio-economic issues in 
Brazil-USA affairs after Vargas’ unsuccessful dealing with the Eisenhower administration, in the 
first half of the decade.4 
In its domestic institutional format, this new historical course was translated into the 
creation of the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE), in 1952. The period was also 
markedly shaped by the dissemination of ideological formulas favoring fast-paced 
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industrialization which exerted a profound ideational influence among bureaucrats working in 
the governmental agencies. To be sure, mid-century Brazilian economic thought and policies 
manifested a pragmatic orientation, especially in light on the growing need felt by important 
members of national elites for pursing fast economic growth. This was particular true in the case 
of the increasingly debated goal of substitutive industrialization which received important 
conceptual support from the innovative formulations produced by the United Nations-sponsored 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the late 1940s and early 50s. Along these 
lines, Vargas’ and Kubitschek’s common agenda can be also demonstrated in the list of 
economic priorities produced by the BNDE-ECLA Joint Study Group which, coordinated by 
rising economists of the stature of Roberto Campos (who headed the BNDE staff) and Celso 
Furtado (representing ECLA), examined the conditions of the country’s economy in the mid-
1950s. The Joint-Group produced one of the best analysis of the national Brazilian economy ever 
published and which inspired the ambitious plan of rapid economic growth by means of targeted 
investments in key economic sectors implemented by the Kubitschek administration in the 
second half of the decade, under the appellation of Targets Plan. 
Industrialists assembled at the National Industrial Confederation (CNI) and at the 
Industrial Federation of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), in particular were very receptive to these 
ideas and, as early as in 1950, the CNI published a special issue of its main publication, the 
Journal of Economic Studies (Revista de Estudos Econômicos), subscribing to the pro-industrial 
developmental theses proposed by the ECLA. The Confederation also provided the funds needed 
to conduct the initial meetings between representatives of the BNDE and ECLA which began 
taking place at the beginning of 1953.5 Similarly, the most influential sectors of organized 
industrial labor in the core urban centers of the country consistently engaged in partaking in the 
7 
 
rich discussion pertaining to national development. That convergence of interests actually shaped 
the main political contours of the period, particularly in its second half of the 1950s.6 
After having run another successful political campaign which also promised rapid 
economic growth under the label of fifty years [of progress] in the five years of his presidential 
term, Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira comes to power in January 31st, 1956. The expression 
‘Fifty Years in Five’ was the slogan of the candidate’s political platform and, as an overarching 
goal, the defining direction of his ensuing administration. On his first day as president, on 
February 1st, 1956, JK created the national Council of Development (CD), a new umbrella-like 
agency designed to implement his ambitious developmental plan based on the goal of fast-paced 
substitutive industrialization. The origins of the new agency can be found in the suggestion made 
by Lucas Lopes and Roberto Campos who prepared for the new president a list of economic 
areas to receive special treatment from the administration, which provided the bases for the 
drafting of the Targets Plan.7 
The Council of Development was headed by a Secretary-General, who also served as 
president of the BNDE, and composed by senior members of both civil and military sectors of 
the administration requested to serve in different roles. Daily operations were structured around 
what were called Working and Executive Groups, each one with its own mandate and 
membership structure. Working Groups performed the functions of investigating specific 
economic sectors selected as worthy of receiving priority action from the administration and of 
putting together legal projects in support of these assigned sectors to be presented to the National 
Congress. These groups did not have any executive role and their decisions were not binding to 
any sector of the government beyond the Council. Executive Groups, on the other hand, were 
powerful inter-ministerial bodies which could also include representatives of the business sectors 
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and which held the legal authority to elaborate binding legal projects for specific sectors of the 
economy.8 
Departing from Vargas’ more state-focused approach, Kubitschek sought to attract 
foreign investors to finance his ambitious economic agenda. And one of the most assertive ways 
to achieve this goal involved special privileges granted to local subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations interested in domestically producing previously imported manufactured items. 
Favored treatment dispended to foreign investors that had agreed to set up or expand industries 
in Brazil was above all carried out by the legal stipulations prescribed in the Normative 
Instruction #113 of the Foreign Trade and Exchange Division of the Bank of Brazil (SUMOC), 
which provided preferential rates of exchange to imported capital goods to supply their domestic 
branches. In the dearth of multilateral and inter-governmental loans available to Brazil in the 
international arena, Instruction #113 proved to be the most effective instrument for attracting 
private foreign investments in the second half of the 1950s.9 To illustrate this point, it should be 
noted that about 70 per cent of all foreign private investments coming into Brazil during the 
period (estimated as approximately US$ 500 million) consisted of industrial material brought 
into the country under the rubric of supplier’s credits (i.e. credit lent by international private 
investors in the form of industrial components) with low interest rates and with the approval and 
co-signing of BNDE.10 
One of the main achievements of the Kubitschek administration, and clearly a 
quintessential expression of the developmental logic of his tenure was the creation of a ‘national’ 
(although essentially foreign-owned and controlled) industrial park in the automobile sector. 
Between 1956 and 1960, the Council of Development approved thirty projects for the installation 
or expansion of motor vehicle industries in Brazil with technology from fourteen different 
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companies from several different countries (such as the USA, Germany, Italy, Sweden, France, 
England and Japan). In addition to direct credit provided by the National Bank of Development 
for the construction of industrial plants, the largest portion (64 per cent) of all foreign 
investments arriving in the country in the years between 1956 and 1961 equally consisted of 
advanced credits in the form of supplier’s credit provided by the headquarters of the foreign 
vehicle companies with BNDE’s approval and underwriting.11 Specific measures were also 
implemented to promote vertical integration in certain industries and to remove production 
bottlenecks, particularly in more strategic areas such as the automotive, steel and aluminum, 
cement, cellulose, heavy machinery and chemicals industries. In addition, the federal 
government amended the exchange-control system and tariff legislation in order to protect 
domestic industries and to attract foreign investors. A new law was passed in 1957 which 
simplified the exchange rate system and guaranteed favorable conditions for some strategic 
sectors, such as petroleum, fertilizers, paper and heavy machinery.12 
The 1950s in Brazil represented, therefore, a moment of important economic 
transformations particularly pertaining to the deepening of the process of industrialization. There 
was an annualized economic growth for the entire period of around 7.5 per cent, while industrial 
growth averaged around 11 per cent a year – considering, however, that population growth 
throughout the 1950s was around 3 per cent annually, per capita income growth for the period 
was less than 5 percentage points yearly. More substantially, life expectancy rose in about 7 
years, and literacy was for the first time ever above 50 per cent of the national population.13 
These social and economic achievements notwithstanding, and even though the political 
leadership of the period propounded the promises of national development as way to expand 
economic self-reliance, the most influential economic policies carried out in the period 
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augmented the embeddedness and rate of dependence of the domestic productive structures 
within the complexities of an emerging global economy. What is more, despite the ability of the 
central government to lead the way, by no means had the Brazilian state a monopoly on the 
process of envisioning the developmental course the country should embark upon. The ensuing 
section below scrutinizes one important set of debates taking place during those years as way to 
demonstrate how the goal of national development engaged different groups of the Brazilian 
society in a prolific, though politically divisive reflection on the future of the country.      
  
Brazil at a Crossroads: Debating National Development in the 1950s 
The literature on the fast-paced economic growth experienced in Brazil in the post-war 
period is vast and has been constantly expanding. One of the most studied aspects of these 
historical events has been the intensification of import substitution policies aimed at 
simultaneously stimulating economic growth and protecting national manufactures from external 
shocks and competition. Akin to the experiences taking place in some other Latin American 
countries, the post-World War II period in Brazil corresponded to an idiosyncratic transition 
from an agrarian and export oriented economy into an increasingly urbanized and industrial 
society.14 
The conversion to heavy industrial production was indeed one of the main priorities of the 
political and intellectual agendas of the time. The economic and geographical complexity of 
transitioning to an urban, industrialized society created major challenges for providing and 
maintaining the necessary leadership to sustain minimum levels of social cohesion. As a result, 
the central government emerged as the main political player capable of formulating and enacting 
new strategies of capital accumulation while at the same time, controlling the increasing 
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conflicting private interests originating from the path of accelerated industrialization.15 A 
significantly revamped federal bureaucracy led the way in the goal of repositioning the country’s 
historical pattern of dependent insertion into the international economy. This goal was carried 
out despite the fact that any nationalist approach pursued in the Latin American context in the 
period was bound to face the structural constraints deriving from the consolidation of the U.S. 
supremacy in the Western hemisphere.16 
Much of the scholarship on the 1950s, especially on the so-called 'JK Era' (as the years 
between 1956 and 1961 are also commonly known), has portrayed the period as being uniquely 
democratic and defined by a widely shared optimistic outlook about the country’s future17 
Similarly, the creation or reorganization managerial agencies within the structures of the 
executive branch have been assumed to be an uniquely efficient instrument for implementing an 
ambitious agenda of industrial growth.18 Where Vargas’ return to power heightened the political 
polarization of the period, Juscelino Kubitschek managed to secure a more conciliatory path of 
state-led, fast-paced industrialization in the latter years of the decade, primarily by resorting to a 
developmental model that strategically assigned roles to be played by both state-owned and 
private (national and foreign) enterprises. With the exception of a few strategic sectors (e.g. 
hydroelectricity), Kubitschek created very few state-owned companies, in marked contrast with 
the style of the previous Vargas’ administration. 
The search for a new developmental pathway for the country in the 1950s was 
conceptually grounded on important intellectual disputes that marked the preceding decade, 
especially the one between neo-classical Economics professor Eugenio Gudin and the 
industrialist Roberto Simonsen, as well as by the propositions and examinations originating at 
the aforementioned ECLA.19 Particularly relevant in formulating a nationalistic ideology of 
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development, the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB), a government-funded official 
academic organization created in 1955, served as the main arena for reflecting on the promotion 
of development within the framework of a project which was to be directed by the national state 
in association with the country’s intellectual and economic elites.20 ISEB intellectuals tended to 
see the Brazilian society through binary lenses that posited the existence of an emerging modern-
looking industrial economic sector tied to the domestic market, in opposition to a backward, 
commodity export-oriented sector that sustained foreign, so-called anti-national, interests. 
A founding member of the ISEB and one of its most influential figures, Hélio Jaguaribe 
consistently argued that the main economic problems the country faced derived from the 
continued deterioration of the terms of trade for agricultural products on the international market. 
Along notions earlier advanced in the analyses produced at the ECLA, he believed that the 
Brazilian economy had, for far too long, been dependent on commodity exports; something 
which he saw as becoming unsustainable given the growing domestic demand for the 
importation of ever more expensive manufactured goods. Likewise, in the author’s always 
controversial views, the precarious economic situation the country faced in the 1950s – given 
that the national economy faced growing deficits in the current and balance-of-payment accounts 
– could not be overcome unless the federal government assumed an assertive role in the 
promoting of fast-paced development.21 
Jaguaribe’s reasoning was grounded on an opposition said to exist between the so-called 
colonial condition and the state of being a fully independent nation. This heuristic recourse was 
present in several works produced at the ISEB and which found resonance in ideas advanced by 
important European authors of the same period and mainly concerned with African and Asian 
countries.22 Considering that the anti-colonial argument advanced by these latter authors was not 
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applicable in its entirety to the reality of Latin American states – where political formal 
independence had been achieved 150 years earlier – ISEB intellectuals went to great lengths to 
devise and advocate the notion of a semi-colonial condition to account for the realities of 
countries like Brazil. This latter concept was defined as more aptly describing heteronomously 
defined societies which, regardless of being formally independent could not fully exercise their 
sovereignty given that their commodity-exporting economies were essentially organized on the 
basis of attending foreign interests. The semi-colonial condition was also said to be translated 
into a state of underdevelopment characterized by large rates of unemployment and 
underemployment, low economic productivity, low wages, low per capita income, lack of 
investment capital, and social fragmentation between social groups involved in the dynamic 
exporting sector of the economy and those tied to subsistence agriculture.23 
In tandem with Jaguaribe’s comparative frame of analysis about the colonial or semi-
colonial condition, the ISEB’s Executive Director in the 1950s, Roland Corbisier, centered his 
own examinations on what he defined as the cultural dimension of colonialism. He claimed that 
even if different from the realities of the actual colonial territories of early Twentieth Century, 
Brazil did not differ from them insofar as they commonly shared a lack of the means to exert 
economic and, thus political self-determination. An autonomous path of development, more than 
mere formal (legal) independence, was what effectively defined the achievement of national 
autonomy. And, in his view, what primarily defined the condition of colonialism and 
underdevelopment was the generalized sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the industrialized regions of 
the world. Moreover, while economic self-reliance seemed essential, such a reality could not 
become possible, unless cultural autonomy (i.e. a sentiment of national pride) existed.24 
14 
 
Similar notions can be found in the contribution of Alvaro Vieira Pinto, an influential 
philosopher of the National University of Rio de Janeiro who served as the Institute Executive 
Director from 1960 to 1964, and whose research centered on inserting the needs of the common 
people into the philosophical reflection. Pinto’s works at the ISEB were largely based on a 
Hegelian-Marxist inspiration and he would become one of the more radical intellectuals of the 
Institute. From his critical perspective, Pinto argued that national development had primarily to 
serve the interests of the working sectors and defended an approach that primarily aimed to 
incorporate the lower social sectors. In his own words, “(…) without an effective ideology of 
national development interested in attending the needs of the majority of the population, no 
development can be achieved.”25 What is more, overcoming underdevelopment demanded an 
end to the existing division between industrialized and non-industrialized countries. Such a 
radical aim required that national development be pursued on a more autonomous path by 
harnessing the potentialities and the collective will of the populations of all developing nations in 
favor of an alternative path of economic insertion into the world economy.26 
As can be seen from the above, ISEB was a nationalist intellectual agency that clearly 
advanced the position that the condition of underdevelopment would not be eliminated unless the 
relationships of dependence established among industrialized and non-industrialized states would 
be similarly eliminated. The task required political developmental projects to be fostered in both 
domestic and international arenas under a committed political leadership and a shared vision of 
the future. In the ISEB’s frame of analysis, the nation was an entity said to be defined not only 
by its current attributes but also by its prospective possibilities and, along these lines, the 
Brazilian nation was seen as still in formation; development was a project that had yet to be 
constructed on the basis on an effective understanding of the country’s possibilities and its 
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population’s needs. In other words, national development was defined as a political proposition 
strategically deployed for achieving the fulfillment of a country’s potentialities. A nationalistic 
course of development had therefore to include the entire country’s population while a key role 
in the process was to be played by the national intelligentsia acting within the structures of a 
coordinating socially responsive government. 
It should be noted that the historical importance of the ISEB’s formulations on national 
development in the 1950s (and in subsequent decades) notwithstanding, the Institute never 
assumed an executive role in the Kubitschek administration. In fact, the connections between the 
scholarly debate within ISEB and policy-making were at times distant and tenuous. Ironically, 
Jaguaribe produced a summary of the central ideological divide between the main developmental 
positions advanced in the 1950s (within and beyond ISEB). In his view, the main disagreement 
between what he labeled as ‘nationalists’ and ‘cosmopolitans’ had to do with the role that foreign 
capital would play in developing the national economy.27 Whereas the former label was to 
include those favoring a more autonomous (i.e. autarchic and less dependent on international 
investors and markets) path of national development for their country, the latter group was said 
to defend the notion that unless a higher degree of internationalization of the domestic economy, 
by means of attracting foreign sources of capital investment, could be achieved, no sustainable 
(i.e. long-term) economic development would be attained. 
Even though these two positions initially coexisted within the realm of the ISEB, as the 
Kubitschek administration’s projects focusing on fast-paced economic growth were being 
implemented in the second half of the decade, it would become increasingly more difficult to 
reconcile those different views. Jaguaribe would become closely aligned with the view of more 
centrally placed decision-makers, such as Roberto Campos and Lucas Lopes, key figures in the 
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Kubitschek administration. This would eventually lead to Jaguaribe’s departure from the Institute 
which would progressively become the main defender of a radically nationalist path of national 
development the early 1960s.28 
The intellectual discussion about development alternatives was therefore frankly open. A 
leading figure in the formulation and implementation of the Targets Plan, Roberto Campos 
strongly believed that the reasons for the economic underdevelopment of the country rested 
mainly on the absence of investment capital and the low purchasing power of its population. 
Despite serving as a member of the Board of Trustees of the ISEB, Campos’ ideas were in direct 
contrast with the positions of Corbusier, Pinto and (the early) Jaguaribe. In his view, what was 
primarily required for economic development to take place was attracting large sums of foreign 
investment to selected economic projects. By the same token, Campos demonstrated a continued 
concern for the problem of inflationary state spending, particularly during his terms as Director 
and President of the National Bank of Economic Development and Executive Director of the 
Council of Development, the two main agencies created by the Brazilian government in the 
1950s to promote economic growth primarily by means of fast-paced industrialization.29 
What is more, Campos consistently argued against the notion that the Federal government 
should ultimately seek to attend basic social needs by becoming the main promoter of 
development via excessive public expenditures. Alternatively, in his view, given the insufficient 
rate of domestic savings, the main task that the government should pursue was convincing 
foreign investors to set up shop in the county so that a higher economic performance could be 
reached. In his own words, “the option of development requires, above all, the acceptance by 
everyone that fast economic growth, not socially oriented disbursement, is the main task at hand 
and the only way to reduce social economic inequalities.”30 
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By the same token, even if arguing for a more favorable international environment for 
development promotion in the periphery, Lucas Lopes – first and most influential secretary-
general of the Council of Development and Kubitschek Finance Minister in 1958/59 – made sure 
to not partake in the ISEB’s defense that Brazil should establish strategic alliances with other 
developing countries. He did acknowledge that the economic assistance coming from the 
industrialized world had been insufficient, but vehemently expressed his conviction that center 
countries were becoming increasingly more receptive to the plight of developing nations. In his 
opinion, “the selfish forces of colonialism are being destroyed and a more liberal spirit is 
becoming increasingly noticeable in projects such as the Marshall Plan.”31 
Despite influential in provoking a prolific and influential national debate regarding the 
future of the country which was carried out in the national media and reached ever more 
segments of the broad urban society, the ISEB’s core propositions were not be actively pursued 
by the central developmental agency of the Kubitschek administration. In fact, while continually 
providing institutional (logistic and financial) support for the intellectual agency, the federal 
government implemented economic projects structured along its own notions of national 
development, which were based on a significantly more strict, essentially economic reading of 
the national reality. This perspective was fundamentally defined by the notion that the main 
impediment for Brazil’s economic take off derived from its historical lack of sources of capital; 
something which only could be resolved if the developmental focus of the national government 
centered on findings ways to attract and maintain foreign sources of investment. Moreover, in 
direct contrast with core notions espoused at the ISEB, this technocratic conception of 
development equated the very term development with the goal of fast rates of economic growth; 
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a logic which clearly meant the downplaying, if not the total elimination of the very search for 
political autonomy which had been so forcefully argued for by most members of the Institute. 
In short, despite their prolific production, the nationalistic and more socially inclusive 
perspective espoused by the ISEB consistently contrasted directly with the more market-oriented 
views held by the much smaller group of Kubitschek’s close economic advisors (particularly 
Lucas Lopes and Roberto Campos) who favored a more significant participation of private 
(foreign and domestic) investors and more strict control over public expenditures.32 In the end, 
the successes (and shortcomings) of the ’JK Era’ and the embodiment of a limited and fragile 
version of a developmental state that occurred in the period resulted precisely from a 
convergence of national and international factors, as well as from the ability of government 
officials to pursue economic policies informed by a reductionist conception of national 
development focused essentially on absolute rates of growth and industrial output (what was 
curiously and paradoxically supported by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) since 1958). 
To conclude this synthetic analysis of the main intellectual positions that defined the 
consolidation of the developmental state in Brazil, beyond the nationalist perspective 
propounded by the ISEB and other intellectuals working in Rio de Janeiro a group of more left-
wing academics, many Marxists, coalesced at the prestigious University of São Paulo (USP) 
around the influential figure of the sociologist Florestan Fernandes. This more radical position 
refused to see the strategic role that a potential political alliance to be established between the 
domestic bourgeoisie, middle-income urban sectors, and organized industrial labor would play in 
the promotion of national development given the ever closer links being established between 
Brazilian industrialists and multinational corporations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
19 
 
Particularly relevant to demonstrate the plurality of views on national development in 
those years, instead of the mere containment of economic exploitative foreign interests 
(described as imperialism), as advocated by the majority of the writers associated with the ISEB, 
the so-called paulista school (i.e. school from São Paulo) articulated a more incisive critique of 
the foundations of advanced capitalism in Brazil, seen as a process that was discriminatory and 
inherently inadequate to meet the country’s rising social demands. Fernandes indeed stressed that 
the industrialization taking root in the late 1950s had to be seen as a concerted effort on the part 
of the bourgeoisie to preserve its interests through a combination of old and new mechanisms of 
capital accumulation.33 
It should also be noted, as will be further demonstrated in the next section of the paper, 
that one of Fernandes’ most prominent followers was Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a graduate 
student at the University of São Paulo in the 1950s who played a leading role in the 
reformulation of the Dependency paradigm in the mid-1960s.34 Rejecting the dichotomy between 
development and dependency, Cardoso emphasized the socio-political nature of the economic 
relations of production, arguing that ‘associated-dependent’ development is possible and can 
reconcile the interests of the foreign corporations with the internal prosperity of the ‘dependent’ 
countries.35 Ironically, as Brazil approached the dawn of a new century, in the 1990s, Cardoso 
had become one of the most skilled and articulated proponents of a neoliberal (market-driven) 
path of development.36 Cardoso’s personal trajectory is indeed indicative of the long-term course 
of the developmental dynamics Brazil has undergone in the last 60 years, as will be examined 
next. 
 
Reflecting on 1950s and Its Relevance for Today 
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Any accurate assessment of these historic developmental experiences in Brazil should 
begin by noting that the Kubitschek administration basically maintained and expanded the 
macroeconomic strategies introduced by the Vargas government, which resulted in an annual 
rate of GDP growth of more than 7% between 1950 and 1961 (with industry growing 9% in the 
period, compared with 4.5% for agriculture). These economic achievements notwithstanding, it 
is also important to point out that the institutional arrangement behind the Targets Plan was only 
capable of sustaining itself in conditions of fast industrialization with relative stable prices, 
which also benefited from cheap international credit and state-driven repression of the cost of 
labor. 
In fact, the economic project was progressively weakened due to conditions of economic 
stagnation and accelerated inflation. Industrial expansion also resulted in a substantial increase in 
imports, notably of inputs and machinery. The large influx of foreign capital in the 1950s 
worsened the foreign debt and produced an inflationary cycle due to constrain to supply domestic 
demand (inflation reached 21.1% in 1956, 15.9% in 1957, 14.7% in 1958, 39.2% in 1959 and 
29.4% in 1960).37 The focus on industrialization and heavy industries was achieved at the 
expense of other traditional productive sectors, in particular agriculture which was increasingly 
taxed, only sparing the rural sectors already well-off and more technologically advanced.38 What 
is more, the economic model of the 1950s was in actual fact followed by a long tendency for the 
profit rate to fall in the next decades mainly because of the declining productivity of capital, 
which can be partially explained by the growing cost of capital goods and a failure to provide a 
significant rise in capital and labor productivity.39 After the (also) circumstantial economic boom 
in the 1970s, there was a growing exhaustion of the import-substitution model based protective 
barriers on industrial imports and an increasing reliance on foreign manufacturing technology.40 
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What is more, through these same transformative though socially highly problematic 
years, the general standards of living deteriorated, poverty increased, and inequalities 
worsened.41 Similarly, despite the significant industrial expansion the country experienced from 
the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the national economy remained predominantly agrarian and 
underdeveloped for the vast majority of Brazilians who continued to be illiterate and face dire 
living conditions on a daily basis. The 1960 national census figures, published by the statistics 
agency IBGE, for instance, showed that 39.7% of the country’s adult population (15 years of age 
or more) was illiterate (a total of 16.0 million people), that life expectancy was 52.3 years, child 
mortality was 118.13 per thousand, and that 58% of the population lived below the poverty line. 
This apparent discrepancy between localized improvements and the alleged generalized 
gains is even more evident when one contrasts the widespread sense of optimism in favor of the 
developmental efforts of the federal government with a close examination of the dynamics on the 
ground during the 1950s. What national development was and how it should be conducted were 
arguably the most important topics of the leading politically-oriented intellectual reflections and 
political mobilizations of several sectors of the Brazilian society throughout the decade, with 
long-lasting consequences for the economic and social life of the country. The many different 
social groups involved in developmental debates of the time (i.e. industrialists, farmers, civil 
servants, urban and rural workers, intellectuals) held different levels of political leverage in 
asserting their own notions of development to policymakers in charge of implementing very 
specific projects and policies. Whereas within the Council of Development (the official agency 
of the Federal government created to coordinate the implementation of the Targets Plan), 
national development was conceived primarily as fast economic growth – to be reached 
essentially by deepening the country’s economic integration into global capitalist economy – the 
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execution of the Plan exerted contradictory and increasingly polarizing effects across the 
Brazilian society. 
Considered to be the ‘golden age’ of development promotion in Brazil, the 1950s paved 
the road for the further industrial growth that took place in the following decades. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, however, the overall sense of a national pact (i.e. the attempt by the elites and the 
government to portray higher levels of social convergence than in previous phases) was 
gradually abandoned, while the country experienced a process of political radicalization of both 
left-wing and right-wing tendencies, and developmentalism transmuted into a combination of 
heavy state interventions, autocratic rule, and easy association with Cold War Americanism. As 
the early years of the 1960s were increasingly marred by the political instability of both the brief 
Quadros (Jan-Aug 1961) and the turbulent Goulart (1961-64) administrations, the democratic 
experiences of mid-century were abruptly curtailed and the country dove into a long, repressive, 
and economically exclusionary military regime (1964-85). 
By the late 1980s, the developmentalist economic model of the 1950s was all but 
exhausted and the country, together with most of the Latin American continent, entered into a 
phase of hyperinflation and macroeconomic instability. In the 1980s and 90s, after a convoluted 
transition under three presidents with questionable legitimacy (Sarney, Collor and Franco), the 
sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso occupied center stage of Brazilian politics by leading the 
longue durée of liberalizing reforms and transformation aimed at converting the country into an 
‘emerging’ capitalist economy and, to a large extent, deconstructing the developmental efforts of 
half a century earlier.42 The neo-liberal path of modernization of the 1990s was essentially 
achieved on the basis of new reconfiguration of the balance of power within the national elite 
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along a path that ultimately favored industrial, agriculture and financial groups well connected to 
the international markets.43 
Indeed, after four presidential terms under Cardoso and Lula, which were marked by 
positive economic results and tangible amelioration of the quality of life for many Brazilians, in 
the second decade of the Twenty First Century, the country is again facing the need to reassess 
the bases of its national project and the parameters of its political life. It is beyond the scope of 
this current analysis to discuss in detail all the accomplishments and shortcomings of the most 
recent administrations, but it is nonetheless relevant to point out that even after two decades of 
strong currency holdings and sustained inflow of foreign capital and goods, the Brazilian 
economic growth is increasingly dependent on the exporting of commodities (such as oil, steel 
and soybean and other agricultural goods) and the country experiences a gradual process of 
deindustrialization aggravated by an inadequate and increasingly obsolete infrastructure. 
The recent Lula administration – which in some ways could be considered a post-
neoliberal government which presented important traces of continuity with the more overtly neo-
liberal Cardoso administration – certainly made significant strides towards a more inclusive 
society by means of targeted welfare programs (e.g. the important cash transfer provided by the 
Bolsa Família), but further progress is needed should the goal of sharply reducing social and 
economic inequalities be achieved. This should necessarily include more thorny issues such as 
fiscal reforms, investments in science and education, better infrastructure, and state efficiency 
and transparency. Inherent developmental contradictions also persist, as well illustrated in the 
following figures: while the Bolsa Família transferred R$ 8 billion to the hands of those earning 
less than 40 dollars a month, throughout the eight years of Lula’s tenure in office holders of 
Brazilian bonds received R$ 200 billion in interest.44 
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Its positive outcomes notwithstanding, this new redistributive public policy has only gone 
half way to reducing poverty. In fact, Bolsa Família has disbursed funds equivalent to about 
0.5% of the country’s GDP, while with an estimated use of 1.0% of resources, it would have 
been possible to eradicate poverty in the country.45 Ironically, some of most transformative 
events witnessed in Brazil in the last decade were found in the area of foreign affairs given that, 
as the country became more democratic and inclusive, it has also tried to navigate in more 
autonomous and assertive terms in the global arena. This trend has been clearly shown in Brazil's 
leadership role in the creation of the G-20 as well as in Brazil's growing presence in additional 
multilateral fora such as the World Trade Organization and the group of BRIC countries. 
Similarly, and of special importance, the country’s recent achievements in constructively 
reshaping the political and economic context of South America, through multilateral policies 
carried out at the realm of the UNASUR, MERSOSUR, and the ever more important regional 
loans granted to neighbors by the ever active BNDES, are clear indications of the potential that a 
more politically stable, economic powerful, and diplomatically active Brazil can exert in a 
globalized world.46 
In the 1950s, as well as in present-day Brazil, national development was not a monolithic, 
univocal socio-economic project, but was rather a relevant topic of debate and engagement of 
different social sectors. Examining the developmental experiences of that earlier phase can 
therefore help assess some of the crossroads the country faces today, particularly pertaining to 
the uncertainties caused by a continued over-reliance on the export of primary goods and on the 
inherently ecologically and socially disruptive exploitation of oil and mineral reserves. One 
important lesson from the period speaks to the continued importance of political leadership. It is 
certainly remarkable that despite all the institutional weaknesses the country experienced in the 
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1950s, determination on the part of national administrations headed by charismatic presidents 
played a crucial role in redirecting the overall course of the economy. At the same time, despite 
the high rates of nominal economic growth then achieved, fundamental adjustments in the 
(re)distribution of social opportunities were not pursued and only marginal changes in the social 
structure were seen, primarily deriving from the natural enlargement of the urban middle classes. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Undoubtedly, many things have changed since the mid-twentieth century. Brazil is no 
longer the same country that Vargas and Kubitschek encountered. Its economy is several times 
larger, with a much more diversified industrial base, and its society is much more urban and 
complex. Brazil's political structures and society are also increasingly more democratic and 
stable, there is much higher degree of social inclusion and the country's civil society is more 
dynamic. Despite all these changes, Brazil remains a highly unequal society, with an economy 
substantially dependent on commodity exports and thus, much like in the 1950s, closely 
subordinate to the whims and fluctuations of the global markets’ demands. Although neo-liberal 
economists managed to curb hyper-inflation, the majority of the macro-economic policies 
instituted under the Cardoso administration in the 1990s (which were essentially maintained 
under Lula) have all but perpetuated the corrupted and deleterious logic still operating at the 
country’s main institutions, as daily demonstrated by the inefficiency of the judicial system, the 
dysfunctional performance of the national congress, and the widespread levels of corruption in 
all areas of the public administration. 
Indicative of the fragmented nature of its developmental state, the disagreements among 
Brazilian intellectuals and decision-makers in the 1950s demonstrates not only conceptual 
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divergences but also the multiple, not always reconcilable, commitments of the national 
government. Internal disputes within the intellectual and economic elite also reveal the 
politicized nature of state intervention providing opportunities for stronger groups of interest to 
capture the functioning of public agencies according to their specific demands. In this sense, the 
socio-economic and political achievements of the last decade will not be assured until the very 
structures of the Brazilian state become substantively more democratic. 
This critical challenge was unfortunately avoided in the 1950s, with tragic consequences 
taking place in the ensuing decades when the country was ruled by an authoritarian military 
regime which deepened the path of a conservative, wealth-concentrating modernization. 
Reexamining the 1950s may therefore illuminate the way forward insofar as the need to maintain 
(preferably deepen) the current course of socio-economic and political inclusion, enhance the 
bases of a self-sustaining (though now entirely globally integrated) economy, and transcend the 
patrimonial and still very exclusionary nature of the Brazilian state. 
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